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Abstract 
Nonmonotonic formalisms and belief revision operators have been introduced as useful tools 
to describe and reason about evolving scenarios. Both approaches have been proven effective in 
a number of different situations. However, little is known about their ~lationship. Previous work 
by Winslett has shown some correlations between a specific operator and cir~umsc~ption. I  this 
paper we greatly extend Winslett’s work by establishing new relations between circumscription and 
a large number of belief revision operators. This highlights similarities and differences between 
these formalisms. Furthermore, these connections provide us with the possibility of importing 
results in one field into the other one. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last years, many formalisms have been proposed in the AI literature to 
model commonsense reasoning. Particular emphasis has been put in the formal modeling 
of a distinct feature of commonsense reasoning, that is, its nonmonotonic nature. The 
AI goal of providing a logic model of human agents’ capability of reasoning in the 
presence of incomplete or contradictory information has proven to be a very hard one. 
Nevertheless, many important formalisms have been put forward in the literature. 
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Two main approaches have been proposed to handle the nonmonotonic aspects of 
commonsense reasoning. The first one deals with this problem, by defining a new 
logic equipped with a nonmonotonic consequence operator. Important examples of this 
approach are default bgic proposed in 1321 and c~rc~~~c~~~?~~~ introduced in f29]. 
The second one relies on preserving a classical (monotonic) inference operator, but 
introduces a revision operator that accommodates a new piece of information into an 
existing body of knowledge. Specific revision operators have been introduced, among the 
others, in [ 10, 181. A general framework for revision has been proposed by Alchourron, 
Gardenfors and Makinson in [ 1,171. A close variant of revision is update. The general 
framework for update has been studied in 123,241 and specific operators have been 
proposed in [ 15,351. 
As pointed out by Winslett in [35], the large variety of candidate semantics for 
belief revision and update varies widely in motivations, goals and area of application. 
It is generally believed that there is no “best” method and that each one is suited for a 
particular domain of application. 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between circumscription and many op- 
erators for belief revision and update. A first study of these relations has been done in 
[ 341, where she relates her operator to circumscription. We expand her results showing 
simiiar connections between several other belief revision operators and circumscription. 
To this end, we also introduce a variant of circumscription based on cardinality, rather 
than set-containment. 
The established correlations highlight the relations between the two fields. Moreover, 
as side benefits, they provide us with the opportunity to import results in one field 
into the other one. A practical result is the possibility of directly using algorithms 
developed for circumscription also for belief revision. In the last years, many algorithms 
for circumscription have appeared in the literature (see, for example, [ 19,30,3 I ] ), 
while, to the best of our knowledge, only Winslett in f35 J has proposed an algorithm 
for belief revision. Using our reductions, it is possible to reduce a reasoning problem of 
belief revision into one in circumscription, thus taking advantage of the large number 
of algorithms and reasoning systems already developed. 
In this paper we focus our attention on propositional languages, since some of the 
belief revision operators have only been defined in this setting. However, in Section 9 
we briefly explain how and when our results also apply to full first-order circumscription 
and belief revision. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall some key definitions and 
results for belief revision and circumscription, introduce a variant of circumscription 
(NCIRC), define the kind of relations we want to establish and explain the notation used 
throughout the following sections. In Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 we show the main relations 
between the various kinds of revision operators and circumscription, while in Section 7 
we show relations and reductions between the various operators. In Section 8 we focus 
on syntacti~aIly-restricted knowledge bases. Section 9 discusses possible applications of 
our results with particular attention to the computational complexity analysis, While in 
Section 10 we draw some conclusions. Finally, in the appendices we have the proofs of 
most theorems and a brief description of some complexity classes used for some of the 
results. 
I? Liberatore, M. Schaerf/Art~ciaf Intelligence 93 (1997) 261-296 263 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section we (very briefly) present the background and terminology needed to 
understand the results presented later in the paper. For the sake of simplicity, throughout 
this paper we restrict our attention to a (finite) propositional language. In Section 9 we 
briefly discuss how these results also apply to full first-order languages. 
The alphabet of a propositional formula cx is the set of all propositional atoms 
occurring in it and is denoted by V(a). Formulae are built over a finite alphabet of 
propositional letters using the usual connectives 7 (not), V (or) and A (and). Additional 
connectives are used as shorthands, CY -+ ,B denotes -Q V /3, cx = j3 is a shorthand for 
(CYAP) V(X!A+3). 
An interpretation of a formula is a truth assignment to the atoms of its alphabet. 
A model M of a formula F is an interpretation that satisfies F (written M k F). 
Interpretations and models of propositional formulae will be denoted as sets of atoms 
(those which are mapped into 1). A theory T is a set of formulae. An interpretation is 
a model of a theory if it is a model of every formula of the theory, Given a theory T 
and a formula F we say that T entails F, written T k F, if F is true in every model 
of T. Given a propositional formula or a theory T, we denote with M (2”) the set of its 
models. We say that T is consistent, written T # i, if M(T) is non-empty. 
2.1. Belief revision and update 
Belief revision is concerned with the modeling of accommodating a new piece of 
information (the revising formula) into an existing body of knowledge (the knowledge 
base), where the two might contradict each other. A slightly different perspective is 
taken by knowledge update. An analysis of the differences between belief revision and 
update is out of the scope of this paper, for an interesting discussion we refer the reader 
to the work [24]. We assume that both the revising formuIa and the knowledge base 
can be either a single formula or a theory. 
In the literature, the first formal studies on the principles of belief revision have 
been presented by Alchourron, Gtidenfors and Makinson in [ 1,171. In these papers 
they present a set of postulates that all revision operators should satisfy. These pos- 
tulates, known as the AGM postulates, assume that the revision operator applies to 
a deductively-closed set of formulae. In order to make the presentation more homo- 
geneous, we present the refo~ulation of these postulates where the revision operator 
applies to propositional formuIae. More precisely, we denote with K the knowledge 
base (that is the existing logical theory), with A the revising formula (that is the new 
information) and with * the revision operator. This formulation has been presented by 
Katsuno and Mendelzon in [25], where they prove this set of postulates equivalent to 
the original one. 
Thus, the AGM postulates for (finite} propositional knowledge bases are: 
AGMl. K * A implies A. 
AGM2. If K A A is satisfiable then K * A s K A A. 
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AGM3. If A is satisfiable then K * A is also satisfiable. 
AGM4. If Kt I_ K2 and Ai z A2 then K1 * A1 E Kz * AZ. 
AGM5. (K*A)ABimpliesK*(AAB). 
AGM6. If (K * A) A B is satisfiable then K * (A iz B) implies (K * A) A B. 
The intuitive meaning of the postulates is simple to understand. AGMl states that 
the new information A is always retained in the revision, AGM2 postulates that, if 
no inconsistency arises, A is simply added to K. AGM3 states that inconsistency can- 
not be introduced unless A is inconsistent. Furthermore, because of AGM4 the revi- 
sion operator obeys the Principle of Irrelevance of Syntax and postulates AGMS and 
AGM6 impose constraints on the behavior of revision in the presence of conjunc- 
tions. 
Katsuno and Mendelzon in [25] have shown that, to any revision operator satisfying 
AGMI -AGM6, corresponds a family of reflexive, transitive and total orderings over the 
set of inte~retations, one for each formula K. Given a revision * and its co~esponding 
family of orderings, the following relation holds. 
M(K*A) =min(M(A),&) (1) 
Any given ordering <K has the so-called property of~~~r~~~~~e~~, that can be summ~ized 
as follows: 
(i) If I E M(K) then I <K J for any interpretation J. 
(ii) If I E M(K) and J $ M(K) then J <K I does not hold. 
Roughly speaking, the models of M(K) are exactly the minimal elements of <K, and 
the other inte~retations are ordered according to their distance from models of K: given 
two models I and J, it holds f <K J if and only if I is considered more plausible to 
an agent believing K. In this sense, achieving the principle of minimal change, Eq. (1) 
means that the result of a revision is constituted by the models of A that are closer 
to K. 
We now recall the different approaches to revision and update, classifying them into 
fo~ula-based and model-based ones. A more thorough exposition can be found in [ 131. 
We use the following conventions: the expression card(S) denotes the cardinality of a 
set S, and symmetric difference between two sets Sr, SZ is denoted by Sr n SZ. If S is a 
set of sets, nS denotes the set formed by intersecting all sets of S, and analogously US 
for union; mint S denotes the subset of S containing only the minimal (with respect to 
set inclusion) sets in S, while maxc S denotes its maximal sets. Moreover, we use the 
symbol c to denote strict containment, i.e. Sr c S2 if and only Si C Sz and 3a E S2 
such that a $ Sr. 
Formula-based approaches operate on the formulae syntactically appearing in the 
knowledge base K. Let C( K, A) be the set of the subsets of K that are consistent with 
the revising formula A: 
C(K,A) = {K’ C K 1 K’u {A} #I} 
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and let W( K, A) be the set of the maximal sets of C( K, A): 
W(K,A) =mFxC(K,A). 
- 
The set W(K, A) contains all the plausible subsets of K that we may retain when 
inserting A. 
SBR. In [ 16,181, the revised knowledge base is defined as a set of theories: 
K *SBR A A {K’U {A} 1 K’ E W(K, A)}. 
That is, the result of revising K is the set of all maximal subsets of K consistent with 
A, plus A. Logical consequence in the revised knowledge base is defined as logical 
consequence in each of the theories, i.e. K *SBR A /= Q iff for all K’ E W(K, A), 
K’u {A} + Q. I n other words, Fagin et al. [ 161 and Ginsberg [ 181 consider all 
sets in W( K, A) equally plausible and inference is defined skeptically, i.e. Q must be 
a consequence of each set. For this reason, we term this method as Skeptical Belief 
Revisiorz (SBR). Note that K *SBR A can be equivalently rewritten as VK,EW(K,A) K’. 
Note that formula-based approaches are sensitive to the syntactic form of the theory. 
That is, the revision with the same formula A of two logically equivalent theories K1 
and K2, may yield different results, depending on the syntactic form of K1 and K2. We 
illustrate this fact through an example. 
Example 1. Consider K1 = {a, b}, K2 = {a,~ ---f b} and A = Tb. Clearly, K, is 
equivalent to K2. The only maximal subset of K1 consistent with A is {a}, while there 
are two maximal consistent subsets of K2, that are {u} and {a --+ b}. 
Thus, KI *SBR A = {u, ~b}whileK~*saaA={(u~~b)V((a--+b)A~b)}thatis 
equivalent to {lb}. 
Model-bused approaches instead operate by selecting the models of A on the basis of 
some notion of proximity to the models of K. Model-based approaches assume K to be 
a single formula, if K is a set of formulae it is implicitly interpreted as the conjunction 
of all the elements. Many notions of proximity have been defined in the literature. We 
distinguish them between pointwise proximity and global proximity. 
We first recall approaches in which proximity between models of A and models of K 
is computed pointwise with respect to each model of K. That is, they select models of 
K one-by-one and, for each one, choose the closest model of A. These approaches are 
considered as more suitable for knowledge update [ 241. Let M be a model, we define 
,u( M, A) as the set containing the minimal differences (with respect to set inclusion) 
between each model of A and the given M; more formally: 
p(M,A) Am$n{MA N 1 NE M(A)}. 
_ 
We also use the notation kM,A to denote the minimum cardinality of sets in ,u( M, A), 
i.e. kM,A =min(n 1 n = ISI, SE ,u(M,A)). 
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Winslett. In [35] the models of the updated knowledge base are defined as 
M(K*wA)-{N~M(A)13M~M(K):M~N~p(M,A)}. 
In other words, for each model of K he chooses the closest (with respect to set- 
containment) models of A. 
Borgida. This operator *n, defined in [ 21, coincides with Winslett’s one, except in the 
case when A is consistent with K, in which case Borgida’s revised theory is simply 
K AA. 
Forbus. This approach [ 151 takes into account cardinality: The models of Forbus’ 
updated theory are 
M(K*FA)A{NgM(A) 13MEM(K):card(MnN)=kM,A}. 
Note that by means of cardinality, Forbus can compare (and discard) models which are 
incomparable in Winslett’s approach. 
We now recall approaches where proximity between models of A and models of K is 
defined considering globally all models of K. In other words, these approaches consider 
at the same time all pairs of models A4 E M(K) and N E M(A) and find all the 
closest pairs. Let 6( K, A) denote the set of minimal differences between a model of A 
and one of K. More precisely: 
6(K,A) Amin U ,u(M,A). 
- MEM(K) 
Similarly to the local approach, we use the notation kK,A to denote the minimum 
cardinality of sets in 6( K, A), i.e. kK,A = min(n 1 n = (SI, S E S( K, A) ). 
Satoh. In [ 331, the models of the revised knowledge base are defined as 
M(K*sA)k{N~M(A) IWeM(K): NLUSS(K,A)}. 
That is, Satoh selects all closest pairs (by set-containment of the difference set) and 
then projects on the models of A. 
Dalal. This approach is similar to Forbus’, but global. In [ lo] the models of a revised 
theory are defined as 
M(K~,A)A{NEM(A) 13M~M(K):card(NnM)=ks~}. 
That is, Dalal selects all closest pairs (by cardinality of the difference set) and then 
projects on the models of A. 
Example 2. Let K and A be defined as 
K=aAbAc, 
A=(?aA~bAld)v(?cAbA(a_ld)). 
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Note that K has only two models, which are 
JI = {a, b, c, d}, 
J2 = {a, b,c}, 
while A has four models, 
II = {a, b}, 
12 = {c}, 
13 = {b, d}, 
L+=0. 
The set differences between each model of K and each model of A are: 
IAJ II = {a, b} 12 = {c} I3 = {b,d} 14 = 0 
JI = {a,b,c,d} {c,d} 
J2 = {a,b,c} {c} 
{a&d} {a,~} 
(0, bl {a, c, d} 
{a, b, c, d} 
{a, b, c} 
Hence, the minimal differences between J1 and models of A are p( J1 , A) = {{c, d}, 
{a, b, d}, {a, c}}; Th e minimal differences between 52 and models of A are p( J2, A) = 
{{c>~ {a,bll. 
The cardinalities of set differences between each model of K and each model of A 
are: 
card(l A J) 11 = {a, b} 12 = {c> 13 = {b, d} I4 = 0 
J1 = {a,b,c,d} 2 3 2 4 
J2 = {a,b,c} 1 2 3 3 
Winslett. The minimal differences in p( J1 , A) correspond to the models II, 12, I3 of 
A, while those in ,u( J2, A) correspond to the models It, 12 of A. Therefore, the models 
of K *W A are {Ii, 12,13} U {II, 12) = {II, Iz,Z3}. The same result holds for Borgida’s 
revision, since K and A are inconsistent. 
Forbus. From the table with cardinalities: the minimal cardinality of differences between 
JI and each model of A is kJ,,A = 2, corresponding to models II and 13; while kJz,A = 1, 
corresponding to Il. Therefore, K *F A has models {It, 13) U {II} = {II, Zj}. 
We now turn to global proximity approaches, where also entries in different rows of 
the above tables are compared for minimality. 
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Satoh. The minimal differences between any model of K and any model of A are 
6(K, A) = {{c}, {a, b}}. Th ese minimal differences correspond to models It and 12 of 
A, which, therefore, are the models of K *S A. 
Dalal. The minimum cardinality of all set differences is kK,A = 1, corresponding to It. 
As a result, K *D A selects the model It only. 
2.2. Circumscription 
Circumscription has been originally introduced in [ 291. Further extensions have been 
proposed by several authors. Here we stick to the semantic formulation of circumscrip- 
tion and restrict our interest to a propositional language. Following [ 261, we define: 
Definition 3. Let T be a propositional formula, V(T) = {xl,. . . , xn} its alphabet, 
P, Q and Z disjoint sets of letters partitioning V(T) (i.e. P U Q U Z = V(T)) and 
M E M(T) M is called a (P Z) -minimal model of T if there is no model N of T such 
that NnQ=MnQ and (NnP) c (MflP). 
Definition 4. The circumscription of T with respect to the three sets of letters P, Q 
and Z, denoted as CIRC(T; P, Q, Z), is an higher order formula whose set of models 
is the set of all (P Z)-minimal models of T, i.e. M b CIRC(T; PQ, Z) iff M is a 
(P Z) -minimal model of T. 
Informally, P is the set of letters we want to minimize, Q is the set of fixed letters, 
while letters in Z are allowed to vary. Given two interpretations M and N, we use 
the notation M <(Ez) N to state that M is “(P Z)-smaller” than or equal to N, that 
is (M n Q) = (N n Q) and (M f? P) C (N f’ P). When we write M <(p,z) N we 
mean that M is strictly “(P, Z)-smaller” than N, that is (M n Q) = (N n Q) and 
(MnP)c (NnP). 
2.3. Curdinalio-based circumscription 
The minimality criterion of circumscription is based on set-containment. We now 
introduce, for propositional languages, a version of circumscription based on cardinality. 
Definition 5. Let T be a propositional formula, V(T) = {xl, . . . , x,} its alphabet, P, Q 
and Z disjoint sets of letters partitioning V(T) (i.e. PUQUZ = V(T)) and M E M(T). 
M is called a (P Z)-cardinality-minimal model of T if there is no model N of T such 
thatNnQ=MflQandjNnPl<IMnPI. 
Definition 6. The cardinality-based circumscription of T with respect to the three sets 
of letters P, Q and Z, denoted as NCIRC(T; P, Q, Z), is an higher order formula 
whose set of models is the set of all (P, Z)-cardinality-minimal models of T, i.e. 
M /= NCIRC(T; P, Q, Z) iff M is a (P Z)-cardinality-minimal model of T. 
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In other words, I am preferring models with the least number of true letters of the 
set P, rather than models with a least set of true letters. Given two interpretations M 
and N, we use the notation M d(ez) N to state that M is “(P, Z)-cardinality-smaller” 
than or equal to N, that is (MnQ) = (NnQ) and j(MflP>l < I(NnP)l. Again, 
M 4(ez) N denotes strict ordering. In order to better clarify the difference between 
CIRC and NCIRC we provide an example: 
Example 7. Let T be defined as 
T= (aV4) A (nVc) A (bVc) A (eVbVc). 
Note that T has four models, which are 
Ml = {a, b}, 
M2 = {c}, 
M3 = {a, C>> 
M4 = {u, 6, c}. 
If we minimize all letters (P = {a, b, c, d}, Q = Z = 8)) the (P, Z)-minimal models 
are Ml and M2. In fact, M3 and M.4 are not minimal since M2 <(ez) M3 <(Rz) M4. On 
the other hand, there is only one (P, Z)-cardinality minimal model, since M:! 4cp.z) MI. 
In fact, M2 n P has cardinality 1, which is strictly smaller than the cardinality of MI n P. 
Cardinality-based circumscription is a natural variant of circumscription well-suited for 
all the applications where cardinality minimization is adopted as a preference criterion. 
One such domain is diagnosis, where cardinality minimization is often adopted as the 
choice criterion. 
2.4. Types of reductions 
In this paper we investigate whether circumscription and belief revision can be trans- 
lated one into the other. To this end, we take into account various forms of reductions. 
Formally, a reduction from circumscription into belief revision is a pair of functions 
ft and f2 that take as input a four-tuple T, P, Q, Z and produce two formulae K = 
fl (T, P,Q, Z) and A = fz(T,P, Q, Z). Clearly, we want that the reduction preserves 
the semantic content of the original knowledge base. Given a circumscriptive theory 
CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) and a revision operator * we want that K = fl (T, P, Q, Z) and A = 
f2 (T, P, Q, Z) are such that the following relation holds, 
{r/CIRC(T;P,Q,Z) ~;r>={~lK*At=~y), (2) 
y being any formula in which only symbols of T occur. We call this property query- 
equivalence, and we say that if K * A satisfies the above criterion then the result of the 
reduction is query-equivalent o CIRC( T; R Q, Z). Symmetrically, if given K and A we 
find a T, P, Q and Z such that the relation (2) holds (where y is a formula using only 
symbols of K and A), we say that CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) is query-equivalent to K * A. 
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A tighter equivalence criterion we might look for is a form of equivalence character- 
ized by the following requirement: 
CIRC(?‘;P,Q,Z) 3 K*A. (3) 
We call this property Eugicai e~u~v~le?zce, and we say that if a pair of formulae K and A is 
such that K*A satisfies the above criterion it is EogicuZZv equivalent to CIRC( T; P, Q, Z). 
Notice that if K * A satisfies logical equivalence (3) it satisfies query-equivalence (2) as 
well, but not the other way around. Basically, query-equivalence (2) gives the possibility 
of introducing new propositional letters. This has definitely an impact on the possibility 
of translating circumscription into belief revision, as we will show. Symmetrically, if 
given I( and A we find a T, P, Q and Z such that the relation (3) holds (where y is 
a formula using only symbols of K and A), we say that CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) is logically 
equivalent to K * A. 
The above properties do not take into account the computational cost of the reductions. 
This is far too general, in fact, unrestricted reductions are of little practical interest and, 
furthermore since both circumscription and the belief revision operators can represent all 
boolean functions, unrestricted reductions always exist. For this reason, we consider two 
restrictions on the cost of reductions: if the reduction can be computed in polynomial 
time (i.e. both fi and .f2 can be computed in poiynom~al time), we call it a p~~~-t~~le 
reduction. On the other hand, if the size of the result of the reduction is polynomial in 
the size of the inputs (i.e. the result of both SI and f2 has size polynomial), we call 
it a poly-size reduction. Note that poly-size reductions are more general than poly-time 
ones. In fact, a11 poly-time reductions are also poly-size, while the contrary does not 
necessarily hold. While poly-time reductions are of obvious interest and are the most 
widely used form of reduction used in theoretical computer science (see [ 20]), in this 
paper we also take into account reductions that cannot be accomplished in poIynomia1 
time, but only increase the size by a polynomial factor. Another important property of 
reductions is modularity. Adapting the definition of Imielinski in [ 2 1 ] to our setting, 
we say that a reduction from circumscription into belief revision is modular if, given T, 
P, Q, 2 K and A such that CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) is logically (query-) equivalent to K * A, 
and a new formula y, CIRC( T U y; P, Q, Z) is logically equivalent to K * (A U f(y) ). 
In other words, the reduction from (F P, Q, Z) into (K, A) is modular if adding a new 
formula to T, does not require to r~ompute I( and A from scratch, but only adds on 
top of them. 
2.5. Useful previous results 
There a number of results that are used throughout the paper. These include known 
reductions between various forms of circumscription as well as computational results on 
both circumscription and belief revision. 
The first important result is shown by de Kleer and Konolige in [ 121 where they 
prove the following corollary: 2 
* Adapted to a propositional language and rephrased using our terminology 
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Corollary 8. Let Q’ be n new set of letters one-to-one with Letters in Q. Then 
CIRC(TA(~~~~‘>;PU~u~‘,0,z> 
is query-equivalent to CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) 
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This result has been further refined by Cadoli, Eiter and Gottlob who in [S] show how 
to eliminate varying predicates from a circumscription. However, their method allows to 
rewrite a circumscriptive theory and a query into a new circumscriptive theory without 
varying letters. It does not provide any straightforward way to rewrite a circumscriptive 
theory with varying letters into one without varying letters, independently of the queries 
that will be posed. 
Note that the above corollary also holds for NCIRC. In fact we have: 
Corollary 9. Let Q’ be a new set of letters one-to-one with letters in Q. Then 
NCIRC(TA(Q=-Q’);PUQUQ’,@,Z, 
is que~-equ~vu~ent to NCIRC( T; P, Q, Z). 
The issue of reducing belief revision into circumscription has been analyzed by 
Winslett in [ 34,351, where she shows a reduction from her operator for belief revision 
into circumscription. The reduction we propose in Section 4 is slightly simpler than the 
one she presented, but is less general, since it only applies in the propositional case. 
Relations between circumscription and belief revision have also been pointed out by 
Satoh in [33]. 
In the paper we will also take advantage of the results on the complexity of inference 
and model-checking. The complexity of inference for circumscription has been studied 
by Eiter and Gottlob in [ 14f where they show that inference for circumscription is a 
fig-complete problem. Cadoli in [ 31 has shown that deciding whether an interpretation 
is a (P, Z)-minimal model of a theory is a coNP-complete problem. 
The complexity of deciding K * A k Q (where * is one of {*sun, *w, *n, *F, *s, *o}, 
K, A and Q are the input) was studied in [ 131: in Dalal’s approach, the prob- 
lem is PNp[o(‘~~~‘)l-complete, while in all other approaches it is ~~-complete. While 
the complexity of model checking, i.e. deciding M b K * A (where * is one of 
{*sum, *w, “1-3, *F, *s, *D}, K, A and M are the input) was studied in [28]. 
In order to show that, in some cases, there is no poly-size reduction we use the results 
on compactness of representations proved by Cadoli, Donini, Silvestri and the present 
authors in [4-71, where it is analyzed the relative compactness of various Knowledge 
Representation formalism to represent knowledge. A brief presentation of the technical 
tools used in those proofs is in the Appendix. 
2.6. Notations 
In order to make formulae more compact and easier to understand, we introduce a 
number of notations that we use in the rest of the paper. 
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In the paper we frequently use the notion of substitution of letters in a formula, The 
notation Ff n-/y] denotes the formula F where every occurrence of the letter x is replaced 
by the formula y. This notation is generalized to ordered sets: F[ X/Y] denotes the for- 
mula F where all occurrences of letters in X are replaced by the corresponding elements 
in Y, where X is an ordered set of letters (in general, X C V(F) ) and Y is an ordered 
set of formulae with the same cardinality. That is, F[X/YI = F[xl,/yi,. . . ,xk/yk]. For 
example, let T = (XI A (+s V x2)) and Y = {yi,y~,ys}+ Then the formula T[X,/Y] is 
(3?r /“\ (2 V?&?.)). 
In order to make the formulae more compact and readable, we overload the boolean 
connectives to apply to sets of letters. For example, given three disjoint sets of letters W, 
S and R with the same number of elements k, we use the notation (-S) as a shorthand 
for the formula r\{Tsi / Si E S), (S - R) to denote A{si % Y, / I 6 i < k), (5’ s of?) 
to denote r\(si I lli / 1 6 i < k} and (5%‘~ (5’ - -R)) for I\{w~ 5 (Si G -v;) / 1 6 
i 6 k}. For example, the formula 
TA(W?(X%?Y), 
where T = (xi i\ (1x3 V .X-J) ) is a shorthand for 
3. Global model-based operators 
In this section we establish relations between circumscription and the operators intro- 
duced by Satoh and Dalal, that are based on global minimality. 
3. I. Satoh’s revision 
The connections between circumscription and Satoh’s revision [33] are very simple. 
This is due to the simiIarity of these operations: CIRC takes the models with a minimal 
set of positive atoms of P, whereas Satoh’s revision selects the models of A with a 
minimal set of differences with models of K. 
To translate CIRC( T; P, 0, Z) into a Satoh’s revision it is enough to revise the knowl- 
edge base with all atoms in P negated. More precisely, we have 
Theorem 10. (?P) ss T is log~ca~iy ~~u~va~ent to CIK(T; e o), Z) . 
Proof. Let M be a (P, Z)-minimal model of T. By definition, for all models N of T we 
have that (Nn P) pI (Mn P). Therefore, M has minimal distance from the models of P 
and, therefore, it is a model of 1P *ST. Now, let M be a model of -P*sT. By definition, 
for a11 models N of T and ail models L of TP, we have that (N n L) $ (M a L). 
Therefore, M is a model of T and it has minimal distance from the models of P. Hence, 
it is a model of CIRC(T;P,@,Z). 17 
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Note that the above one is a modular poly-time reduction that satisfies both logical 
and query-equivalence, but it assumes that Q = 0. By combining the above theorem and 
Corollary 8 we obtain: 
Corollary 11. (-P) *S (T A (Q E -Q’)) is query-equivalent o CIRC( T; P, Q, 2). 
Here Q’ is a set of new letters one-to-one with letters in Q. The above reductions 
are simple because Satoh’s revision seems somewhat more powerful than CIRC. In fact, 
it has CIRC as a sub-case, where K is a set of literals. However, it can be shown 
that Satoh’s revision can be translated, satisfying query-equivalence, into circumscrip- 
tion. 
Given a knowledge base K and a revising formula A, let X = V(K) U V(A), Y and W 
two new distinct sets of letters, one-to-one with letters in X, we define Ps = W, Qs = 8 
and 2s = X U Y and Ts as follows: 
Ts = K[X/Y] A A A (-W EE (X = Y)). 





Using the above equation we obtain 
T7= [Yl AY21 
A[(1xlAl~2AlX3)V(~X2A(x, =7x3))] 
* ](lWl = (XI = yt)) A (7w2 s (x2 ry*)) A (-ml3 f (x3 z y3))] 
Note that TS admits a model M iff Mx = ( M n X) is a model of A and MY = (M n Y) 
is a model of K[X/Y]. The knowledge of Mx and My uniquely determines which 
letters of W will belong to Mw = (M n W). In fact, wi E Mw if and only if Xi E Mx 
and vi +! My or Xi $ Mx and yi E My. 
The set W here plays the role of the ab predicates used by McCarthy in [29]. In 
fact, a model will satisfy a w; only if there is no way to assign the same truth value to 
x, and yi. Therefore, if we force Mw to contain a minimal number of letters, we will 
retain only the models of TS where the differences between the assignments to X and Y 
are as few as possible. Thus we obtain 
Theorem 13. CIRC(Ts; W 0, X U Y) is quepequivalent to K *s A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) C V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
CIRC(Ts; W, 8, X U Y) k y implies that K *S A b y. Assume that CIRC(Ts; W, 8, X U 
Y) + y and K *S A # y. Thus, there exists a model Mx of K *S A such that Mx # y. Let 
Mi be a model of K such that IV> n Mx E 6( K, A). We define ~~ = {yi 1 xi E ML) 
and MW = {W I ((Xi E Mx) and (yl $4 MY)) or: ((x, $ Mx) and (yi E My))). 
NOW, let M = MX U My U Mcv. Obviously, it holds that M /= 7’s and M if y. If M is 
a ( W X U Y)-minimal model the thesis follows, so assume that there exists a model 
N of TS such that N <(p.z) M. Since N is a model of TS and it cannot contain more 
fiterals of W than M, we have that NW = (N n W) C Mw. Hence, the distance between 
Nx=NnXand NY= N n Y is smaller than the distance between Mx and Mr. Thus, 
Mx is not one of the models of A closest to the models of K. As a consequence, Mx 
is not a model of K *s A and contradiction arises. 
We now show that K *s A /= y implies that CIRC(Ts; W, 8, X U Yf b y. Assume 
that K *s A k y and CIRC(Ts; w 8, X U Y) # y. Thus, there exists a model M of 
CIRC(Ts;W;@,XUY) suchthatM#y.LetMx=MnX,weshowthatMx+K*sA. 
It immediately follows that Mx k A, if Mu y is one of the models of A closer to 
models of K the thesis follows, so assume to the contrary that there exists a Nx 5 
X, different from Mx, such that Nx k A and the distance of Mx from the closest 
model of K is a strict superset of the distance of Nx from its closest model of K, i.e. 
,u( Nx, K) C ,x( Mx, K) and ,u( Nx, K) # ,LL( Mx, K). Let Ni be a model of K such 
that Nk a Nx E 6(K,A). Let Nr = (vi 1 x; E N>), Nu; = {t% / ((x; E N,Y) and (.v; $ 
NY)) or ((xi $ Nx) and ( yi E NY))} and N = Nx U NY IJ NW. Obviously N is a 
model of K[X/Y] A A A (-W z (X s Y)), moreover, N <(Ez) M. Hence, M is not 
a ( W, X U Y)-minimal model of K[ X/Y ] A A /\ ( -W z ( X z Y) ), hence contradiction 
arises. 0 
Summing up, we have a modular poly-time reduction from CIRC into Satoh’s revision 
that satisfies logical equivalence and a reverse (modular and poly-time) reduction that 
only satisfies query-equivalence. It is natural to ask whether there exists a (poly-time or 
poly-size) reduction from Satoh’s revision into CIRC that preserves logical equivalence, 
Using the result proven in [‘2’7] on the ~ompl~xity of model checking for Satoh’s 
operator and the known complexity of model checking for CIRC (see [ 3]), we can 
show that: 
Theorem 14. Unless 2; = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K +SS A into 
CIRC( T; P, (2, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. Unless Cf; = II:, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *S A into CIRC( T; I? Q, Z) satisfying fogica~-equivalence, 
Proof. In [ 271 we have shown that the time complexity of deciding whether M k K*sA 
is Z;-complete and that the compilability level of this problem is nu-camp-xi-complete. 
In [ 31 it is shown that deciding whether M k CIRC(T; P,Q,Z) is ~oNP-complete 
and in [5] we proved that the compilability level of this problem is nu-camp-coNP- 
complete. As a consequence, if there exists a poly-time reduction from K *S A into 
CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence we have that a Cs-complete can be 
reduced to a coNP-complete one, and thus, C; C coNP. If there exists a poly-size 
reduction it follows that nu-camp-2’; C nu-camp-coNP (the definitions of these classes 
are in Appendix A). By ]5, Theorem 91 this implies that 2: = II:. c] 
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3.2. Dalal ‘s revision 
The same reductions between Satoh’s revision and usual (set-containment-based) cir- 
cumscription hold between Dalal’s revision [ lo] and cardinality-based circumscription. 
Proofs of all the following theorems are in Appendix B. 
Theorem 15. (-P) *D T is logically equivalent to NCIRC(T; P, 0, Z). 
Note that the above reduction is modular, computable in polynomial time and satisfies 
both logical and query-equivalence, but it assumes that Q = 8. By combining the above 
theorem and Corollary 9 we obtain: 
Corollary 16. (4’) *D (T A (Q f 7Q’) ) is query-equivalent o NCIRC( T; P, Q, Z). 
Here Q’ is a set of new letters one-to-one with letters in Q. To reduce Dalal’s 
revision into cardinality-based circumscription, we use the same relation adopted to 
reduce Satoh’s revision into CIRC, 
K *D A 3 NCIRC(Tp; W, 8, X U Y), 
where X = V(T) U V(A) and TD = K[X/Y] A A A (-W E (X E Y)). Note that, not 
surprisingly, TD coincides with Ts. 
Theorem 17. NCIRC(Tp; w 8, X U Y) is query-equivalent o K *D A. 
We have shown a reduction from NCIRC into Dalal’s revision that satisfies logi- 
cal equivalence and a reverse reduction that only satisfies query-equivalence. We show 
that, unless there is a collapse in the polynomial hierarchy, there is no poly-size or 
polytime reduction from Dalal’s revision into NCIRC that preserves logical equiva- 
lence. 
Theorem 18. Unless NP = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *D A into 
NCIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. Unless Ci = II;, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *D A into NCIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. 
We end this section with a complete example of application of our reductions. We 




Using the reduction of Theorems 13 and 17 we obtain W = {WI, ~2, wj}, Q = 8, 
Z = {x~,x~,x~,.YI,~~,Y~} and 
/2[(-ix~A~x2A~x3)v(~x2A(xI--~3))] 
r\[(lwlr(X1~y,))A(1W2~(X2-yy2))A(~W3--(X3-y3))]. 
This formula admits the models 
Note that the only (W, Z)-minimal and (W, Z)-cardinality-minimal model is M3. In 
fact, 1343 f? X is the only model of K *s A and K *o A. 
4. Local model-based operators 
In this section we establish relations between circumscription and the operators intro- 
duced by Winslett, Borgida and Forbus, that are based on local minimality. 
4. I, W~~zs~ett ‘s update 
Winslett’s update method modifies models of K one-by-one, replacing each one with 
the closest one within the models of A. Local proximity methods are better related to 
circumscription where all letters are minimized. Circumscription without varying and 
fixed letters (i.e. Q = 2 = 0) is immediately expressed as 
CIRC(~;~,0,0) 3 7P *wT 
Theorem 20. (+) *W T is logically equivalent to CIRC( 7’; P, 8,8) 
In order to reduce Winslett’s update into circumscription, we must ensure that to each 
distinct model of K correspond incomparable models in the circumscriptive theory. Let 
X = V(K) U V(A), Y and W be new sets of distinct variables, each one-to-one with 
variables in X. The desired relation is obtained (only satisfying query-equiv~ence) 
using the following equation: 
Tw=K[X/Y] /\Ar\(-W= (X-Y)). 
In fact, we have 
(5) 
Theorem 21. CIRC(Tw; W, Y;X) is query-equivalent to K *W A. 
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Note that TW is equal to Ts, but now the letters in Y are kept fixed, not minimized. 
We show a negative proof on the existence of a (poly-size or poly-time) reduction from 
Winslett’s revision into CIRC that satisfies logical equivalence. 
Theorem 22. Unless Cq = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *W A into 
CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. Unless 2: = n$, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *W A into CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. 
4.2. Borgida’s revision 
Borgida’s revision operator [2] is very similar to Winslett’s one, the only difference 
being that the result of the first one has to be K A A when not contradictory. It is easy 
to show that *a and *w coincide when K has a single model M. In fact, if M is also a 
model of A, then K *W A = K A A = K *B A. If M is not a model of A the equivalence 
follows from the definition. As a consequence, the same reduction used for *w also 
holds for *n. That is, 
In the other direction, one can find a direct transformation from Borgida’s revision 
into circumscription, very much like Winslett’s one. The fact that the result must be 
K A A can be taken into account by selecting the models of this formula as minimal. 
K*BA =+ CIRC(Ts;RUZUK! @,XUY), 
where X = V(K) U V(A), Y, W and R are new sets one-to-one with the elements of X 
and TB is defined as follows: 
TB=[KV(YER)]AK[X/Y]AAA[~WE(XEY)]. 
In fact, we have 
(6) 
Theorem 23. CIRC( TB; cl! R, X U Y) is query-equivalent o K *B A. 
As for the other operators, we show a negative proof on the existence of a (poly- 
size or poly-time) reduction from Winslett’s revision into CIRC that satisfies logical 
equivalence. 
Theorem 24. Unless Z’; = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *B A into 
CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. Unless Ci; = n$, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *B A into CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. 
4.3. Forbus’ update 
We first observe how circumscription and NCIRC can be expressed using Forbus’ 
update. Reduction of NCIRC to Forbus’ operator is trivial: 
NCIRC(T;P,@,@) + -P +T. 
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Theorem 25. (-P) *F T is bgicdiy equivulent to NCIRC( T; P, &8). 
The reduction of Forbus’ update to circumscription is very similar to Borgida’s one. 
We have only to take in account that Forbus’ update is based upon a minimization of 
the cardinality of the distances between models. 
The reduction is: 
K *F A + CIRC(Tr; V Il;XU W), 
where TF is defined as 
TF=KIX/Y]AA/\(~W~(X~Y))AEQ(W,V)ABEGIN(V). (7) 
The formula DJ( W, V) is a polynomial-size formula that is true if and only if W 
and V have exactly the same number of positive literals. It can be constructed in several 
ways, if n is the cardinality of the two sets, the simpler formula representing this 
boolean function uses two n-bits adders and then forces the two results to become 
(bit-by-bit) equal. Finally, BEGIN states that the positive literals of V are its first 
ones: 
BEGIN(V) = (on + u,_~) A. ‘. A (u2 -+ ul). 
Any interpretation M of VU W satisfying EQ( W, V) /\BEGIN( V) is such that jMn VI 
= /M n WI and oi E M if and only if for all 1 < j < i we have Ui f M. That is, an 
interpretation of the set V has all the true atoms “at the beginning”. 
In fact, we have 
Theorem 26. CIRC(7”; V I: X U W) is q~~e~“eqz~~~~a~e~t to K *F A. 
Summing up, we have a reduction from NCIRC into Forbus’ revision that satisfies 
logical equivalence (when Q = Z = 0) and a reduction from *F to CIRC that only 
satisfies query-equivalence. We show a negative proof on the existence of a reduction 
from Forbus’ revision into CIRC that satisfies logical equivalence. 
Theorem 27. Unless C! = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *F A into 
CIRC( T; P, Q, 2) satisfying logical-equivalence. Unless xg = IIf;, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *F A into CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. 
We end this section with an example of application of our reductions. We reduce 
Winslett’s, Borgida’s and Forbus’ operators to CIRC. 
Example 28. We use the same formulae K and A used in Example 12. 
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For Winslett’s revision we use the reduction of Theorem 21 and we obtain P = 
{wI,w~,w~},~={Y~,Y~,Y~}, Z={XI,~,.Q} andTw, 
TW=[YI A~21 
A i(TXl A 7x2 A 1x3) v (7x2 A (XI s 1x3))] 
A I +Jl = (XI = VI)) A (-wz - (x2 = y2)) A (w3 E (x3 = ys))]. 
This formula admits the models 
Ml = (y1 >y2, WI, W2}> 
MZ={Y,,)‘2,Y3,W,,W?,W3}, 




Since we can only compare models with the same assignment to the letter in Q, the 
(P, Z)-minimal models are M3, M4 and Mg. In fact, M3 n X = {xl} = M4 n X and 
M6 n X = {x3} are the only models of K *W A. 
For Borgida’s revision we use the reduction of Theorem 23 and we obtain P = 
{wl~“2Tw3}, Q={~I,Y~,Y~}, z={xl,X2,X3,Yl,y2~Y3} and TB, 
TB=[(xIAx~)V((YI-II)A(Y~-~~)A(Y~--~))I 
A IYI AY21 
A[(Txl A%2A%3)V(‘X2A(X1 =1X3))] 
~[(1W1-((X1~Yl))~(1W2-((X2-y2))A(~W3-((X3-Y3))]. 
This formula admits the models 
MI ={Y,~Iv~,wI,w~~~,,~~}, 
M2={yl,y2,y3,w~,w2,w3,r~,r2,r3}, 
M3 = {XI 3 YI > ~2, ~2, r~ 1 r2}, 
M4={ ~l~yl,y2,y3,~2,~3,~1,~2,~3}, 
Since we can only compare models with the same assignment to the letter in Q = 
{rl ,r2,r3}, the (P,Z)-minimal models are Ms, M4 and M6. In fact, M3 nX = {xl} = 
M4 n X and M6 n X = (x3) are the only models of K + A. 
For Forbus’ revision we use the reduction of Theorem 26 and we obtain P = 
{hyW5u3}, Q={YltY2TY3}, Z ={xI~X2,X3,W.W2,W3} and TF. 
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TF= [Yl AY21 
A[(~xlA~X2A~X3)V(~X2A(X~ =‘Tq))] 
* [(7w = (XI = Yl)) A (7w2 - (x2 -y2)) A (iW3 E (,q E y3))] 
AEQ(W, VI A [(u3 + 02) A (~2 + u,)]. 
This formula admits the models 
Since we can only compare models with the same assignment to the letters in Q = 
{yl, ~2, y3}, the (P, Z)-minimal models are M3, M4 and Mg. In fact, M3 n X = {x1} = 
M4 n X and Mg n X = {x3} are the only models of K *F A. 
5. Formula-based operators 
The only formula-based operator we have analyzed is SBR, introduced by Ginsberg 
and Fagin, Ullman and Vardi. This operator is quite similar to Satoh’s principle of 
minimization. The main difference between them is that the latter minimizes distance 
given as set of literals, while the first one maximizes the number of preserved formulae 
of K. 
Two simple reductions from SBR into circumscription, and vice versa, are the fol- 
lowing ones, 
CIRC(T;P,0,Z) =+ (4’) *mT, 
K *SBR A =+ CIRC(Tm; I: 8, x), 
where K={fl..., f,,!}, X = V(K) U V(A), Y is a set of m new letters one-to-one with 
formulae of K and TSBR is defined as 
More precisely, we have: 
Theorem 29. (-P) *SBR T is logically equivalent to CIRC( T; P, 8, Z) and CIRC( TSBR; 
x 8, X) is query-equivalent o K *SBR A. 
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Using Corollary 8 we can also obtain a reduction from CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) into SBR 
that preserves query-equivalence. We close this section with an example of application 
of our reductions. We reduce SBR to CIRC. 
Example 30. We use the same formulae K and A used in Example 12, but K is now 
a set of two formulae. 
K=(x,,x2}, 
Using the reduction of Theorem 29 we obtain P = {y,, JQ}, Q = @, z = (x, , x2, .Q} 
and TFBR, 
T~~~=[(~X,A~X2A~X~)V(~X2A(X1E~X3))1 
A C(y1 = 1x1) A (Y2 = 7x211. 
This formula admits the models 
MI = {Yl >Y2}9 
M2={xl,Y2)> 
M3={x3J17Y2}. 
Note that the only (P, 2 )-minimal model is MT. In fact, W( K, A) = {XI } and, 
therefore, Ii *sna A = (A A xl). Simplifying the formula we obtain K *SBR A = 7x2 A 
7x3 A XI, whose only model is M2 n X. 
6. AGM operators 
In previous sections we showed how we can reduce specific belief revision operators 
to circumscription and vice versa. Here we present a general methodology to transform 
any belief revision operator. The most general form of belief revision is given by the 
well-known postulates for revision ( AGM postulates presented in Section 2). We want 
to point out that, among the operators considered so far, only Dalal’s one satisfies all 
AGM postulates. Therefore, the reduction presented in this section also applies to *u 
as well. We remind that any operator (*AGM) satisfying the AGM postulates can be 
expressed as 
M(K *ACM A) = min(M(A), &Jr 
where <K is a transitive, reflexive and total relation based on K. 
This ch~acterization suggests to select the minimal models of a formula by imposing 
that models must be minimal with respect to <K. Any ordering over interpretations can 
be represented via a propositional formula LEQK( ., .), such that LEQK( X, Y) is true iff 
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X GK Y. Using this formula, AGM revision operators can be reduced to circumscription 
via 
where TAGM is defined as follows, 
TAGM = A A A[X/Y] A (1~ s LE,%S~(YX)). (8) 
where LESSK( I;‘X) imposes the constraint that for any assignment M to the letters 
of Y and N to the letters of X it must hold that M[ Y/X] <K N. More precisely, 
LESSK( XX) = LEQK( Y,X) A 7LEQK(X, Y). Note that K is missing in the circumscrip- 
tion, since it is implicit in LEQK. 
More precisely, we have: 
Theorem 31. w A CIRC( TAGM; {w}, X, Y) is query-equivalent to K *ACM A. 
We want to point out that these transformations are not necessarily polynomial. In 
fact, we do not know what is the size of the formula LEQ(X, Y) with respect to 
the size of X and Y. It might very well be exponential. However, if the ordering 
relation <K can be decided in polynomial time, then the formula LEQK(X, Y) has size 
polynomial. 
7. Relations among belief revision operators 
In Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 we found relations between circumscription and belief 
revision operators. Here we focus on relations among the various revision operators. 
In particular, we show that Satoh’s and Ginsberg, Fagin, Ullman and Vardi’s op- 
erators can be reduced one to the other and that Winslett’s one can be reduced to 
both. Note that these operators belong to three different classes of operators, namely 
formula-based (Ginsberg, Fagin, Ullman and Vardi), model-based with global proximity 
(Satoh) and model-based with local proximity (Winslett). Therefore, our results make 
evident the similarities between all these operators, pointing out, at the same time, their 
differences. 
Ginsberg, Fagin, Ullman and Vardi’s operator can be reduced to Satoh’s operator 
via: 
K *SBR A =+ Y *s A’, 
where K = {fl . . ..fnt}. Y is a set of m new letters one-to-one with formulae of K 
and 
A’ = A A (VI + f~ 1 A.. A (yn, ----t fn,). 
More formally we have: 
Theorem 32. Y *s A’ is query-equivalent to K *SBR A. 
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The reverse reduction is 
K *s A =+ W *SBR A”, 
where Y and W are sets of new letters one to one with letters of X and 
A”=K[X/Y]AAr\(W+X-.Y)). 
More formally we have: 
Theorem 33. W *SBR A” is query-equivalent o K *s A. 
More complex, but still computable in polynomial time, is the reduction of Winslett’s 
operator into SBR. Denoting with F the following formula, 
F=K[X/Y]AAA(-YvlZ)A(W--t(X-Y)), 
where Y, W and Z are sets of new letters one to one with letters of X. The reduction is 
now the following one: 
K*wA =+ (WUYUZ)*SBRE 
More formally we have: 
Theorem 34. ( W U Y U Z) *sns F is query-equivalent o K *W A 
Composing the reductions of *w to *sn~ and *sn~ to *s we have a reduction of *w to 
*s. All these reductions only preserve query-equivalence, we show that there cannot be 
any (poly-size or poly-time) reduction from either Winslett’s or Satoh’s operator into 
SBR. 
Theorem 35. Unless 2; = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *S A (K *W A) 
into K’ *SBR A’ satis+ing logical-equivalence. Unless 2: = nz, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *s A (K *W A) into K’ *SBR A’ satisfying logical-equivalence. 
8. Syntactically-restricted knowledge bases 
In this section we focus on knowledge bases of a restricted syntactic form. Among 
the restricted cases, Horn knowledge bases are of particular interest for several reasons. 
First of all, since Horn clauses can represent if-then relations, they are expressive enough 
to represent many real situations. Moreover, reasoning with Horn knowledge bases is 
significantly simpler than reasoning with general ones (see [ I I] ) and also revising 
them is, in general, simpler than revising general ones (see [ 131) . 
While reductions from circumscription to belief revision preserve the syntactic form 
of the original theory, reductions from belief revision to circumscription do not preserve 
the syntactic form of the formulae. As an example, notice that the relation X E 7Y 
cannot be expressed as a Horn formula. 
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As a consequence, it is easy to apply results on restricted cases of belief revision to 
circumscription, but the other way around is less likely to produce interesting results. 
There are several reasons why the revision of Horn theories cannot be expressed as 
the circumscription of a Horn formula. First of all, results of Eiter and Gottlob show that 
reasoning with the revision of a Horn knowledge base is coNP-hard for all operators 
considered, while reasoning with Horn theories under circumscription is a polynomial 
task. As a consequence, reductions from belief revision to circumscription preserving 
the syntactic form cannot be done in polynomial time (assuming P # NP). 
Secondly, the result of revising a Horn knowledge base with a Horn formula might 
be a non-Horn formula. For example, the result of {a, b} * (la V -6) is a = lb for all 
operators, and a - Tb cannot be expressed as a Horn formula. On the other hand, the 
circumscription of a Horn theory is a Horn theory. 
9. Analysis and discussion 
In the previous sections we showed new relations relating belief revision operators 
and circumscription. These relations point out the close connections between the two 
fields. We want to point out that our relations can be easily extended to full first-order 
languages, whenever the belief revision operators are defined in this setting. Take, for 
example, the reduction from circumscription into Satoh’s revision operator. The reduction 
also applies when K and A are arbitrary first-order sentences. Clearly, in this case X is a 
set of IZ predicates, each one with its arity, while W and Y are new sets of n predicates, 
one-to-one with the predicates of X. Moreover, the constraint 1W = (X = Y) must be 
expressed as 
where w,, xi and yi are k-ary predicates and zk is a vector of k variables. 
Many side benefits can be obtained from the established relations. In this section we 
want to point out the most important benefits obtained. 
9.1. Compact representation of NCIRC 
In two recent papers [4,7] Cadoli, Donini and the present authors analyze the size 
of the explicit representation of circumscription and belief revision operators. More 
precisely, taking as an example belief revision, it is determined the size of the smallest 
propositional formula Kt that is equivalent to K * A, where * is one of the belief revision 
operators analyzed. 
As it turns out, the size of the explicit representation of the result of revising a 
knowledge base is, in general, exponential with respect to IK] + 1 Al. Differences arise 
between the various operators. The result of revising a knowledge base using Dalal’s 
revision operator admits a polynomial-sized explicit representation, if we allow new 
variables in the representation. More precisely, there exists a formula Ki using the 
letters of K and A and possibly new ones, whose size is polynomial in IK] + IAl, such 
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that, for any q using only variables of K and A we have that K, b q if and only if 
K *D A + 4. 
We show that NCIRC( T; P, Q, 2) always admits an explicit representation whose size 
is polynomial with respect to ITI, via the proof given for Dalal’s belief revision operator. 
NCIRC(T; P, Q, Z) is the set of models of T with a least number of elements. Given T 
and P, we first compute the least number k of true letters of the set P in the models of 
T. At this point, we constrain the formula to have only models that contain at most k 
letters of the set P. This forces the formula to only retain the (P, Z) -cardinality-minimal 
models of T. This can be accomplished by conjoining T with a formula imposing that 
at most k letters of the set P must be true. That is, 
NCIRC(T;P,Q,Z) =TAATMUST(k,P). 
The formula ATMOST( k, P) can be constructed using an n-bit adder (where II = 
IPI) for the letters of P and then constraining the result to coincide with the binary 
representation of k. This a formula has size 0( n3). Thus, the size of TAATMOST( k, P) 
is polynomial in jTI. 
9.2. Computational complexity analysis 
A valuable byproduct of the reductions presented in this work is the ability of im- 
porting complexity results obtained in one field into the other one. For example, in the 
general case, inference using the belief revision operators introduced by Satoh, Borgida 
and Winslett has the same complexity of inference under circumscription. While this 
result is not novel, it has been proven in [ 13,141, several other interesting results can 
be obtained. As an example, it is known that deciding whether a clause follows from 
the circumscription (with all letters minimized) of a theory composed of binary clauses 
(i.e. clauses with at most two literals) is a coNP-hard problem [9]. We can use this 
result to prove that inference in the revision of a knowledge base composed of binary 
clauses is a coNP-hard problem for most operators. 
Corollary 36. Let K and A be two CNF formula where all clauses have at most two 
literals, and Q be a clause. The problem of deciding whether K * A k Q is coNP-hard 
for * E {*S, *D, *W, *B? *SBR}. 
10. Conclusions 
We have presented a complete analysis of the relations between belief revision opera- 
tors on one hand and circumscription and its cardinality-based variant on the other hand. 
Furthermore, we have pointed out the many benefits that the established correlations can 
deliver to the analysis of both fields. 
Our results greatly extends Winslett’s results on transforming her revision operator 
into circumscription presented in [ 341. Even though Winslett’s analysis could be further 
extended to deal with other operators, our results provide us with more direct and simple 
translations. 
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Appendix A. Compilability classes 
In this section we summarize some definitions and results proposed in [5] adapting 
them to the context and terminology of belief revision formalisms. In that paper we 
introduced a new complexity measure for decision problems, called compilubility. Fol- 
lowing the intuition that a knowledge base is known well before questions are posed to 
it, we divide a reasoning problem into two parts: one part is fi~ecf or accessible ofSine 
(the revised knowledge base), and the second one is variable, or accessible on-line (the 
model). Compilability aims at capturing the on-line complexity of solving a problem 
composed of such inputs, i.e. complexity with respect to the second input when the first 
one can be preprocessed in an arbitrary way. We introduce a new hierarchy of classes, 
the ~zon-r~n~fo~ coi~pi~abili~ c/asses, denoted as nu-camp-C, where C is a generic 
uniform complexity class, such as NP, coNP, X;, etc. 
Definition A.1 (nu-camp-C classes). A language of pairs S C Y x z‘* belongs to 
nu-camp-C iff there exists a binary poly-size function f and a language of pairs S’ such 
that for all {x, y) E S it holds: 
Notice that the poly-size function f takes as input both x (the revised knowledge 
base) and the size of y (the interpretation). If we want to rewrite off-line x into a new 
string (fo~ula), our definition requires that we know in advance the size of y. Since 
y is an interpretation of the letters of x, its size is bounded by 1x1 and therefore it is 
known in advance. 
For each C, the class nu-camp-C generalizes the non-uniform class C/poly-i.e. 
C/poIy c nu-camp-C-by allowing for a fixed part x. In Figs. A.1 and A.2 we compare 
the machines co~esponding to C,fpoly and nu-campC. 
We introduce now a reduction between problems. 
Definition A.2 (Non-uniform camp-reducibility). Given two problems A and B, A is 
non-fkformly camp-reducible to B (denoted as A <nu_comp B) iff there exist two poly- 
size binary functions fi and fi, and a polynomial-time binary function g such that for 
every pair (~,y) it holdsthat (x,y) E A ifandonlyif (frfx,iyi),g(f2(~,I~l),~)) E B. 
The <nu-comp reductions can be pictorially represented as shown in Fig. A-3. 
Such reductions satisfy all important properties of a reduction: 
Theorem A.3. The reductions <“u-comp sati@ transit~vi~ and are ~onzpatib~e (in the 
sense of Johnson [ 22, p. 791) with the class nu-campC for every complexity class C. 
t? Liberatore, M. Schuerf/Artijicinl Intelligence 93 (1997) 261-296 287 
Fig. A. I. The C/poly machine. 
- 
Fig. A.2. The nu-camp-C machine 
Fig. A.3. The <nu_comp reduction 
Therefore, it is possible to define the notions of hardness and completeness for 
nu-camp-C for every complexity class C. 
Definition A.4 (nu-camp-C-completeness). Let S be a language of pairs and C a com- 
plexity class. S is nu-camp-C-hard iff for all problems A E nu-camp-C we have 
that A Gu-comp S. Moreover, S is nu-camp-C-complete if S is in nu-camp-C and is 
nu-camp-C-hard. 
We close the section by giving a rationale for the complexity classes we defined. 
Informally we may say that nu-camp-NPhard problems are “not compilable to P”, as 
from the above considerations we know that if there exists a preprocessing of their 
fixed part that makes them on-line solvable in polynomial time, then the polynomial 
hierarchy collapses. The same holds for nu-camp-coNP-hard problems. In general, a 
problem which is nu-camp-C-complete for a class C containing P can be regarded as 
the “toughest” problem in C, even after arbitrary preprocessing of the fixed part. On the 
other hand, a problem in nu-campC is a problem that, after preprocessing of the fixed 
part, becomes a problem in C (i.e. it is “compilable to C”). 
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Appendix B. Proofs of theorems 
Theorem 15. (-P) *D T is logically equivalent to NCIRC(T; P, 8, Z). 
Proof. Let M be a (P, Z)-cardinality minimal model of T and k = IMnPI. By definition, 
for all models N of T we have that 1 N n PI 3 IA4 n PI. Therefore, M has cardinality 
minimal distance from the models of P and, therefore, it is a model of 1P *D T. Now, 
let M be a model of 7P *D T and k = IM n PI. By definition, for all models N of T 
and all models L of TP, we have that card( N a L) > k. Therefore, M is a model of T 
and it has cardinality minimal distance from the models of P. Hence, it is a model of 
NCIRC(T;P,@,Z). 0 
Theorem 17. NCIRC(To; w 8, X U Y) is query-equivalent o K *D A 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) 2 V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
NCIRC(To; K 8, XUY) k y implies that K*DA k y. Assume that NCIRC(To; W; 8, XU 
Y) k y and K *DA # y. Thus, there exists a model Mx of K*DA such that Mx # y. Let 
Mk be a model of K such that card( Mk a Mx) E kk,A. We define MY = {yi I xi E Mly} 
and MW = {w I ((xi E Mx) and (yi $ MY)) or ((xi $i Mx) and (vi E MY))}. Now 
let M = Mx U My U Mw. Obviously, it holds that M k TD and M v y. If M is a 
(K X U Y)-cardinality-minimal model the thesis follows, so assume that there exists a 
model N of TD such that N +(p,z) M. Let Nx = N rl X, NY = N n Y and NW = N n W. 
Since N is a model of TD and it cannot contain more literals of W than M, we have 
that / Nwl < / Mwl. Hence, the distance between Nx = N n X and NY = N (7 Y is smaller 
than the distance between Mx and My. Thus, Mx is not one of the models of A closest 
to the models of K. As a consequence, Mx is not a model of K *D A and contradiction 
arises. 
We now show that K *D A k y implies that NCIRC(To; W, 0, X U Y) k y. Assume 
that K *D A f= y and NCIRC(To; K 0, X U Y) # y. Thus, there exists a model M of 
NCIRC(To; w 0, X U Y) such that M # y. Let Mx = M n X, we show that Mx k 
K *D A. It immediately follows that Mx k A, if Mx is one of the models of A 
closer to models of K the thesis follows, so assume to the contrary that there exists 
a Nx C X, different from Mx, such that Nx k A and the distance of Mx from the 
closest model of K is strictly smaller than the distance of Nx from its closest model 
of K, i.e. card(p(Nx, K)) < card(p(Mx,K)). Let N$ be a model of K such that 
card(Nk n Nx) E kK,*. We define NY = {y; I xi E N(x) and NW = {wi I ((x; E 
Nx) and (Y; $ NY)) or ((Xi $ Nx) and ( yi E Nr ) ) }. Obviously N is a model of 
K[X/Y] AAA(TWS (X 3 Y)), moreover, N +p,z) M. Hence, M is not a (K XUY>- 
cardinality-minimal model of K [ X/Y] A A A (1W E (X E Y) ), hence contradiction 
arises. 0 
Theorem 18. Unless NP = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *D A into 
NCIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisJjiing logical-equivalence. Unless 2; = n!, there is no poly- 
size reduction from K *D A into NCIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. 
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Proof. In [ 281 we have shown that deciding whether M /= K *D A is PNP[o(‘osn)l- 
complete and that the compilability level of this problem nu-camp-NP-hard. It can be 
easily shown that deciding whether M k NCIRC(T; P, Q, Z) is coNP-complete and that 
the compilability level is nu-camp-coNP. If there exists a poly-time reduction from K *D 
A into NCIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence we have that a PNPlo(tosn)~- 
complete can be reduced to a coNP-complete one. As a consequence, PNP1o(losn)l C 
coNP, and this implies that NP = coNP. Moreover, the existence of a poly-size reduction 
implies that nu-camp-NP C nu-camp-coNP, and this implies that Cl; = IIT. Cl 
Theorem 20. (,P) *W T is logically equivalent to CIRC(T; P, G?, 8). 
Proof. By definition of Winslett’s and Satoh’s operators, it follows that (K *S A) G 
(K *W A) when K is a complete formula (i.e. it has only one model). Since there are 
no fixed and varying letters, i.e. P = V(T), we have that 1P has only one model. By 
Theorem 10, the thesis follows. 0 
Theorem 21. CIRC(Tw; w YX) is query-equivalent to K *W A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) C V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
CIRC( Tw; N I: X) k y implies that K *w A k y. Assume that CIRC(Tw; w! Y X) /= y 
and K *w A # y. Thus, there exists a model Mx of K *w A such that Mx # y. Let Mi 
be a model of K such that Mi LI Mx E ,u(Mi,A). We define MY = {y; 1 xi E Ma} 
and MW = {W 1 ((Xi E Mx) and (yi $ MY)) or ((xi $ Mx) and (Y, E MY) I}. 
Now, let M = MX U MY U Mw. Obviously, it holds that M f= TW and M # y. If M 
is a (w X U Y)-minimal model the thesis follows, so assume that there exists a model 
N of Tw such that N <(P,~) M. Since N must agree with M on the letters of Y (i.e. 
NY = N n Y = MY) and it cannot contain more literals of W than M, we have that 
NW = (N n W) C Mw. Hence, the distance between Nx = N n X and My is smaller 
than the distance between Mx and MY. Thus, Mx is not one of the models of A closest 
to the model MY of K[ X/Y]. As a consequence, Mx is not a model of K *w A and 
contradiction arises. 
We now show that K*wA b y implies that CIRC( Tw; W Y X) b y. Assume that K*w 
A b y and CIRC(Tw; K YX) # y. Thus, there exists a model M of CIRC(Tw; w YX) 
such that M # y. Let Mx = M n X, MY = M n Y and Mw = M n W. We show that 
Mx b K *w A. It immediately follows that Mx k A, if Mx is one of the models of 
A closer to the model MY of K[X/Y] the thesis follows, so assume to the contrary 
that there exists a Nx C X, different from M X, such that NX /= A and the distance 
of MX from MY is a strict superset of the distance of Nx from My. Let NY = My, 
NW = {w, / ((xl E Nx) and (Y, $! NY)) or ((xl $ Nx) and (yi E NY) I} and 
N = Nx U NY U NW. Obviously N is a model of TW and NW c Mw. Hence, M is not a 
P, Z-minimal model of Tw, and contradiction arises. 0 
Theorem 22. Unless 2; = coNP, there is no polJ-time reduction from K *w A into 
CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. Unless 2: = ni, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *w A into CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfiing logical-equivalence. 
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Proof. In [28] we have shown that the time complexity of deciding whether M /= 
K *w A is ~~-complete and that the compilabil~ty level of this problem is nu-comp-Z’;- 
complete. In [ 31 it is shown that deciding whether M + CIRC(T; P, Q, 2) is coNP- 
complete and in [ 51 we proved that the compilability level of this problem is nu-comp- 
coNP-complete. As a consequence, if there exists a poly-time reduction from K *w A 
into CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence we have that a Z’;-complete can 
be reduced to a coNP-complete one, and thus, 2; & coNP. If there exists a poly-size 
reduction it follows that nu-camp-2; C nu-camp-coNP. By [ 5, Theorem 91 this implies 
that C” = II” 4 4’ 0 
Theorem 23. CIRC( Tn; W; R, X U Y) is query-equivalent o K *n A. 
Proof. We divide the proof into two cases, depending on whether K A A is consistent 
or not. First note that the above formula Tn can be rewritten as the disjunction of 
two formulae TA and Ti, where TA = K A K[X/Y] A A A (-W z (X G Y)) and 
Tz = (Y G R) A K[X/Y] A A A (-W zz (X ES Y)). If K A A is inconsistent, TA is 
identically false and, therefore, TB = Tg. Note that Ti is Tw A (Y s R). But (Y z R) 
does not impose any constraint on the variables in X, therefore it is query-equivalent to 
Tw on X. Since we have already shown that Tw is query-equivalent to circumscription 
the thesis follows. 
Now, assume that K A A is consistent, thus K *a A = K A A. Let y be a formula such 
that V(y) & V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that CIRC(Tn; W, R, X U Y) k y implies 
that K A A k y. Assume that CIRC(Tn; &R, X U Y) /= y and K A A # y. Thus, there 
exists a model Mx of KAA such that Mx # y. We define My = {yi / xi E Mx}, Mw = 0 
and MR = {Ti 1 yi E My}. Now let M = Mx U MY U Mw U MR. Obviously, M is a 
( W, XUY)-minimal model of Tn. In fact, it satisfies TB and, since W = 0, there cannot be 
any smaller model. Therefore, CIRC( T& W, R, X U Y) # y, contradicting the hypothesis. 
It remains to show that K /‘I A b y implies CIRC(Ta; K R, X U Y) /= y. Assume that 
K A A /= y and CIRC(Tn; W, R, X U Y) # y. Thus, there exists a (K X U Y)-minimal 
model M of TB that does not satisfy y. Let Mx = M n X, My = M n Y, Mw = M n W 
and MR = M fl R. We show that Mx k K A A. If M b TA the thesis immediately 
follows, so assume that M v Tf: and M k Ti. Since we know that K /2 A is consistent, 
let Nx be a model of K P, A, NY = (yi / xi f Nx), NR = NW = 8. Now we define 
N = Nx U NY U NR U NW. Note that N + Ti, and therefore, N /= TB. Furthermore, 
N <(tvxuy) M, thus contradicting the hypothesis. q 
Theorem 24. Unless %I; = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K CB A into 
CIRC(T; P, Q, 2) sut~s~~~g logical-equi~~ulence. U~iess Cz = II:, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *B A into CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivaler~ce. 
Proof. In [ 281 we have shown that the time complexity of deciding whether M /== K*BA 
is Z’,‘-complete and that the compilability level of this problem is nu-camp-Cg-complete. 
In 131 it is shown that deciding whether M i_ CIRC(T, P,Q,Z) is coNP-complete 
and in ]5] we proved that the CompiIability level of this problem is nu-camp-coNP- 
complete. As a consequence, if there exists a poly-time reduction from K *B A into 
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CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence we have that a Ci-complete can be 
reduced to a coNP-complete one, and thus, 2; c coNP. If there exists a poly-size 
reduction it follows that nu-camp-C’; C nu-camp-coNP. By [S, Theorem 91 this implies 
that C” = II” 4 4’ 0 
Theorem 25. ( -P) *F T is k~gicully equivalent to NCIRC( T; P, @,8). 
Proof. By definition of Forbus’ and Dalal’s operators, it follows that K *D A E K *F A 
when K is a complete formula (i.e. it has only one model). Since there are no fixed and 
varying letters, i.e. P = V(T), we have that 1P has only one model. By Theorem 15 
the thesis follows. q 
Theorem 26. CIRC(TF; g Y; X U W) is q~e?~-~q~4~valenf to K *F A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) C V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
CIRC( TF; Y x XU W) b y implies that K*FA I=: y. Assume that CIRC( TF; I( I! XU W) /= 
y and K *F A # y. Thus, there exists a model Mx of K *F A such that Mx /# y. Let M’, 
be a model of K such that card{ Mi n Mx) E k~i,~). We define My = (yi 1 xi E Mi} 
and Mw = {wi 1 ((xi E Mx> and (yi # MY)) or ((xi $ Mx)and (n E My))} and 
Mv = {ui 1 EQ( Mw, V) A BEGIN( V)}. Now, let M = Mx U MY U MW U Mv. Obviously, 
it holds that M b TF and M w y. If M is a (VXU W)-minimal model the thesis follows, 
so assume that there exists a model N of TF such that N <(AZ) M. Let Nx = N 1’3 X, 
NY = N n Y and NW = N n W. Since N <(Ez) M we have NY = My and NV c Mv. But 
this also implies that jNwj < IMwj and that the distance between NX = N n X and My 
is (cardinality) smaller than the distance between Mx and My. Thus, Mx is not one of 
the models of A closest to the model MY of K[X,/Y]. As a consequence, Mx is not a 
model of K $2 A and contradiction arises. 
We now show that K *F A /= y implies that CIRC(T& \! E X U W) b y. Assume 
that K *F A f= y and CIRC(TF; r! XX U W) /# y. Thus, there exists a model M of 
CIRC(TF;V!XUW) suchthal M#y.Let Mx=MnX, My=MnY, Mw=MnW 
and Mv = Mfl V. We show that Mx 1 K *F A. It immediately follows that Mx k A, if 
Mx is one of the models of A closer to the model MY of K[X/Y] the thesis follows, 
so assume to the contrary that there exists a Nx C X, different from Mx, such that 
NX j= A and /Nx n MYI < /Mx LI MY/. Let NY = MY, NW = (wil((x, E Nx) and (yi E 
NY)) or (ix; $! Nx) and (vi $ Ny))}, NV = {u; / EQ(Nw,V) ABEGIN( and 
N = Nx U NY U NW U NV. Obviously N is a model of TF and NV c Mv. Hence, M is 
not a (VX U W)-minimal model of TF, hence contradiction arises. q 
Theorem 27. Unless ‘i; = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K *E A into 
CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisbing logical-equivalence. Unless 2: = IIf;, there is no poly-size 
reduction from K *F A into CIRC( T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence. 
Proof. In [ 281 we have shown that the time complexity of deciding whether M j= K*FA 
is 5;‘,‘-complete and that the compilability level of this problem is nu-camp-~~-complete. 
In [ 31 it is shown that deciding whether M b CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) is coNP-complete 
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and in [5] we proved that the compilability level of this problem is nu-camp-coNF- 
complete. As a consequence, if there exists a poly-time reduction from K %F A into 
CIRC(T; P, Q, Z) satisfying logical-equivalence we have that a Z’;-complete can be 
reduced to a coNP-complete one, and thus, 2; 5 coNP. If there exists a poly-size 
reduction it follows that nu-camp-2: C nu-camp-coNP. By 15, Theorem 91 this implies 
that 2,: =IIf;. c1 
Theorem 29. ( 1 P) *SBR T is 10gicdEy equivalent to CIRC( 7’; P, @, 2) and CIRC( TSBR; 
x 8, X) is query-equivalent to K *SBR A. 
Proof. Eiter and Gottlob have shown in [ 131 that K *sn~ A = K *S A if K is a consistent 
set of literals. Therefore, the first reduction trivially holds. 
Coming to the second reduction, we remind that SBR finds the maximal subsets K’ 
of K such that K’ and A are not contradictory, whereas the circumscription of a formula 
takes only the models with a maximal set of false variables. Let Q be a formula on 
the alphabet X such that K *snn A #&. Therefore, there exists a maximal subset F of 
(ft , . . . , fiil) consistent with A such that F A A #Q. Let M be a model of F A A. We 
denote with YF = (yi / fi @ F) and N = M U YF. It imm~iately occurs that N /# Q. 
We now show that N is a minimal model of TSBR. Assume N not minimal, then there 
existsamodelN’ofAA(y,__~fl)A...A(y,,rlf,,)suchthatN’nYcNnY. 
Let F’ = {fi 1 yi $ Y}, clearly N’ k A A F’ and F’ > F. As a consequence, F is not a 
maximal subset of (ft , . . . , f,,?} consistent with A, thus contradicting the assumptions. 
The other direction is similar. Let Q be a formula on the alphabet X such that 
CIRC(Tsan; Y 8, X) #Q. Therefore, there exists a minimal model N of TSBK such that 
N v Q. Let F = {.fi ) yi $! N} and M = N n X. Obviously, M # Q. We now show that 
F is a maximal subset of {ft , . . . , fn,} consistent with A. Assume F is not maximal, 
then there exists an F’ > F consistent with A. Let N’ = MU {yi / fi $ F’). Clearly, N’ 
is smaller of N and N’ h T snn. As a consequence, N is not a minimal model of TSBR, 
thus contradicting the assumptions. q 
Thown 31. w A CIRC(TAGM; {w}, X, Y) is query-equivalent o K *AGM A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) C V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
I\: *AGM A f= y implies that w A CIRC( TAGM; {w>, X, Y) /= y. Assume that K *AGM 
A /= y and w A CIRC(T ACM; {w}, X, Y) #: y. Thus, there exists a model M of w A 
CIRC(TAGM; {w}, X, Y) such that M v y. Let Mx = A4 n X, we show that Mx k 
K *A(;M A. It immediately follows that Mx i== A, so if Mx is <K-minimal the thesis 
follows, so assume, on the contrary, that there exists a model Nx such that Nx <R Mx. 
Let Nr = (vi j x; E Nx} and N = Nx U NY. Since Nx is a model of A and Nx <K Mx, 
we have that NY /= A [ X/Y] and N k T ACM. Note that N <(cz) M, since w E M 
while w $ M. As a consequence, M is not a ({w}, Y)-minimal model of TAGM, thus 
contradicting the hypothesis. 
We now show that w A CIRC(TAGM; {w}, X, Y) F y implies that K *AGM A f= y. 
Assume that 1y A CIRC(T~GM; {w}, X, Y) /== y and K *AGM A # y. Thus, there exists 
a model Mx of K *ACM A such that Mx #: y. Let MY = {yi 1 xi E Mx} and M = 
P Liberatore, M. Schaerf/Artificial Intelligence 93 (1997) 261-296 293 
Mx U Mr U {w}. Clearly, M # y, M k w and M k TAGM. We need to show that M 
is ({w}, Y)-minimal. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists a model N of TAGM 
such that N ccP,z) M. By definition of ({w},Y)-minimality we have w $ N and 
Nx = Mx. Since N b lw we also have that N k LESSK(X, Y). As a consequence, 
we contradict the assumption that the model Mx is &minimal, since the model N = 
Mx U NY satisfies LESSK(X, Y) and therefore, the model L = {x, 1 yi E NY} is such that 
L<KMx. 0 
Theorem 32. Y *S A’ is query-equivalent o K *SBR A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) C V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
K *SBR A k y implies that Y *s A’ k y. Assume that K *SBR A k y and Y *s A’ F y. 
Thus, there exists a model M of Y *s A’ such that M # y. Let Mx = M n X, we show that 
Mx b K *SBR A. Let F = { fi E K 1 M k f;}, we must show that F U {A} E W( K, A). 
Assume, on the contrary, that there exists a set F’ c K such that F c F’ and F’ U {A} 
is consistent. Let Nx be a model of F’ U {A}, NY = {y; 1 fi E F’} and N = NX U NY. 
By construction, N k A’ and (NY n Y) C (MY n Y). Therefore, MY is not a model of 
Y *s A’, thus contradicting the hypothesis. 
We now show that Y *s A’ k y implies that K *SBR A k y. Assume that Y *s A’ v y 
and K *SBR A # y. Thus, there exists a model Mx of K *SBR A such that Mx # y. 
Let F = {fi E K 1 M /= fi}, My = {yi 1 fi E F} and M = Mx U My. Clearly, 
M # y, we need to show that M b Y *S A’. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists 
a model N of Y *s A’ such that (N a Y) C (M a Y). Let F’ = {fi I yi E N}. Clearly, 
N b F’ and N k A. Moreover, since the formulae in A and F’ only uses the letters 
in X, Nx /= F’ U {A}. Therefore, F is not a maximally consistent subset of K, thus 
contradicting the hypothesis. 0 
Theorem 33. W *SBR A” is query-equivalent o K *S A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) C V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
K *S A k y implies that W *SBR A” k y. Assume that K *s A k y and W *SBR A” # y. 
Thus, there exists a model M of W *SBR A” such that M # y. Let Mx = M f’ X, 
MY = M nY and Mw = M 0 W, we show that Mx k K *S A. Clearly, Mx b A, we must 
show that there exists a model Mk of K such that (Mi n Mx) E S( K, A). Assume, 
to the contrary, that there exists a model Nx of A and a model Nk of K such that 
(NI, n Nx) C (Mi n Mx). let Ny = {yi 1 xi E N&}, NW = {Wi I Xi E Nx and vi E 
Nyor x; $ Nx and yi $! NY} and N = N~UN~UN,Y. Obviously, N k A” and Mw C NW. 
Hence, M is not a model of W *SBR A”, thus contradicting the hypothesis. 
We now show that W*SBRA” k y implies that K*s A k y. Assume that W*SBRA” k y 
and K *S A # y. Thus, there exists a model Mx of K *S A such that M # y. Let Mk 
be a model of K such that (Mk n Mx) E 6( K, A), MY = {yi 1 xi E Mk}, Mw = {wi 1 
x, E Mx and y; E MY or x; $! Mx and yi $! MY} and M = Mx u MY u Mw. Clearly, 
M # y, we need to show that M f= W *SBR A”. Assume, on the contrary, that there 
exists a model N of W *SBR A” such that Mw C NW. That is, there is a larger set of 
the letters in W that is consistent with A”. Let Nx = N n X and Nk = {xi I yi E N}. By 
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construction, we have that (Ni n Nx) c (Ml, A Mx). Therefore, M is not a model of 
K *S A, thus contradicting the hypothesis. I? 
Theorem 34. ( W U Y U 2) *SBR F is query-equivalent o K *w A. 
Proof. Let y be a formula such that V(y) G V(K) U V(A) = X. We first show that 
K*w A k y implies that (WUYUZ) *SBR F k y. Assume that K *w A k y and 
( W U Y U Z) *SBR F # y, Thus, there exists a model A4 of ( W U Y U Z) *SBR F such that 
M#y.LetMx= Mnx,M:,={xj/y;EM} we show that (Mi A Mx) E ,u( Ml,, A) 
and, therefore Mx k K *w A. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists a model 
NX of A such that (Mi A Nx) c (Mk Ll Mx). We define NY = My, Nz = Mz, 
Nt~={w~ 1.q~ NxandyiE N~or~i#N~and~~~ Ny}and N=~~UN~UN~UN~. 
Obviously, N /= F and (Mw U MY U Mz) C (NW U NYU NZ >. Hence, A4 is not a model 
of (W U Y U 2) *SBR F, thus contradicting the hypothesis. 
We now show that (W U Y U 2) *SBR F f= y implies that K *w A k y. Assume 
that (W U Y U Z) *SBR F k y and K *W A #. y, Thus, there exists a model Mx of 
K *W A such that M # y. Let Mi be a model of K such that ( Mi LI Mx) E p( M’,, A), 
MY = {yi / x; E M’,}, ME = {zi / y; $! My}, Mw = {kvi 1 x; E Mx and yi E My or xi 6 
MX and x 4 MY} and N = Mx U MY U Mw. Obviously, A4 /== F, we need to show 
that M + (WUYUZ) *SBR F. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists a model 
N of (WUYUZ) *SBR F such that (Mfl(WUYUZ)) C (Nn(WUYUZ)). 
Let N& = {yi / x; E NY}. Since N cannot contain more iiterals of Y or Z without 
violating the constraint -Y V -Z, it follows that (M n W) C (N f! W) and, therefore, 
(Nk n Nx) c (Mi ll Mx). Thus, Mx is not a model of K *w A, thus contradicting the 
hypothesis. c] 
Theorem 35. tinless C! = coNP, there is no poly-time reduction from K xs A (K *w A) 
into K’ *SBR A’ sat~s~~~zg ~ugical-eq~~iva~ence. Unless 32: = II:, there is no poty-size 
reduction .from K *s A (K *w A) into K’ *SBR A’ satisfying logical-equivalence. 
Proof, In [ 281 we have shown that the time complexity of deciding whether M b K*sA 
and M /= K *w A is X$-complete and that the compilability level of this problem is 
nu-camp-~~-complete, while the time complexity of deciding whether M + K *snn A 
is coNP-complete and that the compilability level of this problem is nu-camp-coNP- 
complete. As a consequence, if there exists a poly-time reduction from K *S A (K *w A) 
into K’ *saa A’ satisfying logical-equivalence we have that a C’;-complete can be reduced 
to a coNP-complete one, and thus, 42 _ Vil’ C coNP. If there exists a poly-size reduction it 
follows that nu-camp-Xg C nu-camp-coNP. By [S, Theorem 91 this implies that Xi; = 
II;. q 
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